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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF· UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Jb~S~
~

Case No.

CHARLES ALVAN KENNEDY,
Defendant-Appellant.

------- .
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant appeals from his conviction by the
Court, sitting without a jury, of two counts of Forcible
Sexual Abuse in violation of Utah Code Ann.
as amended.

§

76-5-404 (1953),

The charge was based on appellant's causing

others to take indecent liberties with appellant's wife.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was tried on November 27, 1979 in the
Fourth Judicial District Court for Juab County.

The trial

was conducted before the Honorable Allen B. Sorenson, Judge,
sitting without a jury.

Judge Sorenson found appellant guilty

as charged of two counts of Forcible Sexual Abuse, in violation
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of § 76-5-404, Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended, a
third degree felony.
On January 4, 1980, Judge Sorenson sentenced
appellant to two indeterminate terms not to exceed five (5)
years in the Utah State Prison.
concurrently.

The sentences were to run

(R. at 42-43).
RELIEF SOUGH r ON APPEAL
1

Respondent seeks aff irmance of the judgment and
sentence pronounced by the lower court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 4, 1979 the appellant brought a hitchhikei
named "B.J." to his home in the town of Nephi, Juab County,
Utah (T. 6) .

The appellant asked B. J. to help appellant instaJ

an engine in the latter's truck in exchange for which B.J.
could have intercourse with Toni Kennedy, appellant's wife (T.
When confronted with this proposition, Mrs. Kennedy told
appellant she did not want to have intercourse with B.J. to
which appellant replied that that was the only way he could
get his truck fixed

(T.7).

After B.J. and appellant finished work, B.J. took
a shower, and Mrs. Kennedy again told appellant she didn't
want to have intercourse with B.J.

Appellant then set up a

tape recorder and went into a bedroom closet while B.J. and
Mrs. Kennedy had intercourse (T. 8-9).

Appellant had earli~
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instructed B.J. to teach Mrs. Kennedy "different positions"
in which to have sex (T. 9).
house

bu~

Mrs. Kennedy tried to leave the

appellant caught her and brought her back.

B.J.

had intercourse with her again, while appellant watched, then
appellant had intercourse with her (T. 9).
B.J. stayed with the Kennedy's for three or four
nights and was allowed to have sexual intercourse with Mrs.
Kennedy on all but the last night (T. 12).

Each day, Mrs.

Kennedy told her husband she did not want to have intercourse
with B.J., but appellant forced her to continue until his
truck was fixed (T. 12, 13).
On August 22, 1979, a man named "Rick" appeared at
the Kennedys home.
1979 (T. 14).

"Rick" had been there before in March of

Appellant took Rick to a fast-food restaurant

a few blocks ·away, was gone about forty-five minutes, and when
he returned told Mrs. Kennedy that he wanted her to "go to bed"
with Rick to avoid trouble (T. 15-16).
Later that evening, Rick had sexual intercourse with
Mrs. Kennedy.

Appellant had again turned the tape recorder on

to record the event and was hiding in the closet (T. 17).
listened to the tapes in his shop "over and over again"

He

(T. 28).

Appellant had Mrs. Kennedy return to bed and both Rick and
appellant had sexual intercourse with her (T. 17).

Rick stayed

the next night also and had intercourse with Mrs. Kennedy
again (T. 17).
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Mrs. Kennedy testified that this type of event had
occurred five or six times

(T. 19).

Appellant told Mrs.

Kennedy that he wanted her to go to bed with the men he
brought home and threatened that if she tried to leave, he
would not let her take their baby.

He further threatened to

kill her father if he intervened (T. 19).

Appellant was in.

possession of_ several pictures depicting Mrs. Kennedy in the
act of sexual intercourse with another man which he threatened
to disclose to her father if she did not cooperate (T. 19).
Further, appellant used physical violence or threatened to
use violence against Mrs. Kennedy (T. 20).

She testified that
I

but for appellant's coercion she would not have had intercourse,
with these men (T. 24).
The State introduced the testimony of Sheri Lynn
Blackburn, Mrs. Kennedy's eighteen-year-old sister who

reco~~

that on August 22, 1979 she was taken into the Kennedy's bedroo
by their daughter, Dawn, and was introduced to "Rick" who was
under the "covers" with Mrs. Kennedy (T. 42).

Ms. Blackburn

overheard appellant and Mrs. Kennedy arguing and heard

appell~

tell Mrs. Kennedy that she would do anything he told her to {T.
Upon taking the stand, appellant testifi~d that the~
acts were done with his wife's consent (T. 48).

He admitted

using the tape recorder to "find out what was going on in the
room at the time"

(T. 47).

He also admitted sitting in the
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closet while B.J. and Mrs. Kennedy had sexual intercourse
and later having intercourse with her while B.J. watched
(T. 60).,

Finally, appellant admitted using physical violence

against Mrs. Kennedy during their arguments

(T. 56).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404 (1953), AS
AMENDED, IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
VAGUE PER SE OR AS APPLIED TO THIS
CASE.
Appellant was charged and convicted under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (1953), as amended, which
provides:
(1)
A person commits forcible
sexual abuse if, under circumstances
not amounting to rape or sodomy, the
actor touches the anus or any part of
the genitals of another, or otherwise
takes indecent liberties with another,
or causes another to take indecent
liberties with the actor or another,
with the intent to cause substantial
emotional or bodily pain to any person
or with intent to arouse or gratify
the sexual desire of any person, without
the consent of the other, regardless of
the sex of either participant.
Appellant was convicted of having caused another to take
indecent liberties with his wife, without her consent, and
with the intent to gratify or arouse his own sexual desire.
Appellant contends on appeal that the phrase "indecent
liberties" is so unclear as to render the statute
unconstitutionally vague.

The fact that this statute

does not specifically delineate the types of conduct which
constitute "indecent. liberties" does not render it
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unconstitutionally vague.

Under current standards, a law

is not unconstitutionally vague unless it fails to give
a person.of ordinary intelligence reasonable opportunity
to know what the statute proscribes.

Smith v. Goguen, 415

U.S. 566 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104
(1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156
(1972).
The courts have recognized that where commonsense
understanding reveals the general nature of the conduct
prohibited, the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not mandate complete certainty about the
meaning of statutory terms.

Thus, in a recent case, the

Colorado Supreme Court held that:
Where fairness can be achieved by
a commonsense reading of the statute,
we will not adopt a hypertechnical
construction to invalidate the provision.
People v. Garcia, Colo., 595 P.2d 228, 231 (1979).
State v. Randol, Kan., 597 P.2d 672
Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337

(1979).

See also

In Boyce Motor

(1952), the Supreme Court

of the United States wrote:
But few words possess the precision
of mathematical symbols, most statutes
must deal with untold and unforeseen
variations in factual situations, and the
practical necessities of government
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inevitably limit the specificity with
which legislators can spell out prohibitions.
Consequently, no more than a
reasonable degree of certainty can be
demanded.
Nor is it unfair to require
that one who deliberately goes perilously
close to an area of proscribed conduct
shall take the risk that he may cross
the line.
342

u. s.

33 7' 340.
This Court has also recognized the principle

in State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952),
cited by appellant.

The Court there stated:

The limitations of language are
such that neither absolute exactitude
nor complete precis~on of meaning are
to be expected, and such standard
cannot be required.
250 P.2d 561, 564.

Respondent submits that the phrase

"indecent liberties" is sufficiently precise to give a
person of ordinary intelligence notice that the type of
conduct in which appellant engaged is prohibited.
In the case of State v. MacMillan, 46 Utah 19,
145 Pac. 833 (1915), this Court recognized that the term
"indecent liberties" is self-defining and capable of being
understood by anyone familiar with the English language.
Recently, this Court reconsidered MacMillan in the ·context
of a charge of Forcible Sexual Abuse in State of Utah in
the Interest of J.L.S., No. 16253, decided April 11, 1980.
In that case a minor was charged with taking "indecent
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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liberties" in that he touched the clothed breasts of the
victim.

In reversing the conviction, this Court

reconf inrted the MacMillan decision but added an interpretation of the tenn "indecent liberties" to avoid
vagueness:
In the present statute 76-5-404(1),
the term "indecent liberties" cannot
derive the requisite specificity of
meaning required constitutionally, by
being read in conjunction with the age
of the victim, but if it be considered
as ref erring to conduct of the same
magnitude of gravity as that specifically
described in the statute, the potential
infirmity for vagueness is rectified.
State in the Interest of J.L.S., supra, at pp. 3-4 (emphasis
added).
When the statute is read in terms of this "magnitude
of gravity" test and in the light of commonsense and understanding, as applied to the facts of this case it is not unconstitutionally vague.

Causing another person to have sexual

intercourse with one's wife without her consent is of equal
or greater gravity as touching the anus or genitals of another
or of causing another to do so.

Indeed, the acts of

intercourse engaged in in this case involved unconsented to
"touching" of Mrs. Kennedy's genitals.

Although the conduct

here does not amount to rape, it falls somewhere between rape
and mere touching of another's anus or genitals.
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Further, common usage of the term "indecent
liberties" includes taking indecent liberties with 'the
wife of another person.
intercourse.

This includes the act of sexual

Thus, when the appellant caused others to

have sexual intercourse with the appellant's wife without
her consent, he was causing them to take "indecent liberties''
with her and commonsense would indicate that such conduct
is proscribed by the statute.

As in Boyce Motor Lines,

quoted supra, appellant by engaging in conduct which is
"perilously close" to proscribed conduct assumed the risk
of crossing the line.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN APPELLANT'S CONVICTION.
Appellant contends the evidence adduced at
trial is insufficient to support the conviction.

Specifically,

he alleges that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt:
1)
that appellant caused others to
take indecent liberties with his wife;
2)
that such was without his wife's
consent, and;
3)
that such acts were for the purpose
of arousing or gratifying the appellant's
sexual desires.
Respondent submits that substantial evidence of each of these
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I

elements was presented at trial.
It is well established in Utah that in order for
a

convic~ed

defendant to succeed in challenging on appeal

the sufficiency of evidence adduced at trial, he must
establish that the evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable
doubt that the defendant commited the crime.

State v. Daniels,

584 P.2d 880 {Utah 1978); State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 {Utah
1977}; State v. Jones, 554 P.2d 1321 {Utah

1976).

Such

cases also establish that in considering a claim of insufficency
of the evidence on appeal, this Court must assume that the
trier of fact believed those aspects of the evidence and drew
such reasonable inferences therefrom

~s

support the verdict.

Where, as in the case at bar, the evidence is conflicting:
. . . we are obliged to assume on
appeal that the jury believed those
aspects of the evidence which support
the verdict; and that, in doing so,
there is ~ reasonable basis therein
upon which the jury could believe
that the defendant committed that
offense as charged.
State v. Gandee, 587 P.2d 1064, 1065-1066 (Utah 1978); see
also State in the Interest of M.S., 584 P.2d 914

(Utah 1978),

establishing that the same principle applies to bench trials.
The appellant has failed to meet this showing,
having only pointed to the conflict in testimony at the trial,
and assuming that the only evidence presented was appellant's
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testimony.

The testimony presented by the State shows

appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
First, Mrs. Kennedy established that appellant
made deals with both B.J. and Rick culminating in his
giving them access to his wife (T. 7, 16).

This establishes

that the appellant caused these men to take indecent liberties
with Mrs. Ken_nedy and this testimony was believed by the
trial judge.

Second, Mrs. Kennedy testified that each time

she had intercourse with the other men, appellant set up
a tape-recorder next to the bed and was watching from the
bedroom closet (T. 8, 17).

Further, appellant sat on the bed

and watched while both B.J. and Rick have intercourse with
Mrs. Kennedy (T. 10, 17).

Appellant told B.J. to teach

Mrs. Kennedy different "positions"

(T. 9).

Finally, Mrs.

Kennedy established that appellant listened to the tape
recordings in his shop "over and over again"

( T. 2 8) .

evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that

This

a~pellant

caused these men to have intercourse with his wife to arouse
or gratify his

~exual

desire.

Third, appellant relies on the contention that
these acts were engaged in with Mrs. Kennedy's consen±.
Section 76-5-406, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, provides:
An act of sexual intercourse, sodomy,
or sexual abuse is without the consent of
the victim under any of the following
circumstances:
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(1)
When the actor compels
the victim to submit or participate by force that overcomes such earnest resistance
as might reasonably be expected
under the circumstances; or
(2)
The actor compels the
victim to submit or participate
by any threat that would prevent
resistance by a person of ordinary
resolution . . .
(emphasis added).

Appellant contends that the degree of

resistance necessary to vitiate consent in the case at bar
is the same as that required in rape cases.

Respondent

rejects this contention.
On the facts of the instant case, the "actor" is
not the person committing the act of sexual intercourse,
but rather the person who caused such other persons to
take indecent liberties with Mrs. Kennedy: the appellant.
Thus, in testing the degree of consent by Mrs. Kennedy, the
relevant inquiry focuses on the degree of coercion or threats
which appellant employed to force her to have intercourse
with these men.
Because of the husband-wife relationship between
the appellant and Mrs. Kennedy, the degree of coercion
necessary to overcome her reasonable resistance in this
case is lower than in other circumstances.
exercised inherent authority over his wife.

Appellant
Her alternatives

of leaving appellant completely or of going to the police
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were unreasonable in the circumstances, due to appellant's
threats, detailed below.

Mrs. Kennedy could not legally

force appellant to leave his own home.

Mrs. Kennedy reit-

erated several times at trial that the acts of intercourse
with B.J. and Rick were without her consent (T. 7, 12, 13,
16, 18, 24, 33).

She pleaded with appellant not to force

her to have intercourse with these men, but appellant refused
to listen.

In the five or six times that this conduct

occurred, appellant threatened that if Mrs. Kennedy did not
have intercourse with the men, he would kill her father, would
blackmail her with pictures of she and another man together,
would use these activities to obtain custody of their
children if she tried to leave him, and would "come after her"
if she tried to leave

(T. 19).

Appellant used physical force

against her, and when she tried to get away to avoid having
intercourse with B.J., appellant caught her and forced her
to return to their home (T. 9, 20).

When asked on cross-

examination why she had not reported these acts to the police,
Mrs. Kennedy stated that she was afraid of what might happen
(T.

31).
The psychological effect of these threats

o~

Mrs.

Kennedy is established by the fact that she unsuccessfully
attempted suicide by taking an overdose of pills (T. 22,23).
She felt as though the whole world was against her (T. 23).
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In light of this evidence, Mrs. Kennedy, as a person of
ordinary resolution, could not be expected to have done
more to xesist having intercourse with the other men.

If

she tried to leave she would either be caught or risk losing
her children.

If she tried to physically resist the advances

of the other men, she faced possible forcible compulsion by
either the appellant or the other men, or both.

There is

sufficient evidence here to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that these acts were committed without the consent
of Mrs. Kennedy.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that appellant's conviction
and sentence should be affirmed, since the State produced
sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court's finding of
guilt, and the statute under which appellant was charged is
not unconstitutionally vague.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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